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1. Setting the scene  
 
According to a leading expert in the field: “[t]he risk covered by LEI (i.e. 
legal espenses insurance) is the need to receive assistance in a dispute. 
Contracts will flesh out this broad definition, specifying the nature of the 
assistance (e.g. information, advice, assistance in the strict sense, in or out 
of court) and the type of dispute to which the cover relates in particular 
circumstances” 1. 
It is difficult to indicate a date for the beginning of modern legal expense 
insurance  (W Pfennigstorf 1975 at 453).   
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Since the business was long limited to matters related to automobile 
ownership and automobile traffic, and in some countries still is, the industry 
is often said to have originated in 1917 when the first specialized 
automobile owners’ legal defense company was organized in France (W 
Pfennigstorf 1975 at 455).   
The boom of automobile tourism after World War II produced an increase in 
the demand for LEI: the economic upturn in Europe after the war was, as is 
well known, rapid. Motor cars, which had been nothing more than a 
plaything for the affluent since the 30s, became everyone’s tool and a 
popular symbol of unexpected wellbeing which all aspired to possess. 
Consequently, the number of road accidents increased considerably, the 
third party motor insurance became compulsory in many countries and LEI 
started to expand its scope and goals. 
In 1958 lawyers were invited to a congress by their two most important 
world organisations, the International Bar Association (I.B.A.) and the 
Union Internationale des Avocats (U.I.A.). In both cases the “LEI issue” 
was considered with the same suggestions: the insurers’ contribution should 
be restricted to the financial aspect only, that is payment for the loss and 
lawyers’ fees, the latter freely chosen and appointed by the insured without 
any interference by the insurer in the handling of the dispute 2.  
In the early ‘60s the Commission had just ventured into the European 
insurance labyrinth to launch the first directives to coordinate regulations in 
the insurance field.  One of the first problems facing it was the desirability 
of separating life and nonlife branches according to the formula already in 
use in France, Germany and Holland, where the intention was to prevent 
poor performance of a company in the loss business prejudicing the interests 
of insured parties holding life policies with the same company - socially 
considered to more properly merit protection 3. 
At that time and in the early ‘70s, in most European countries - with the 
significant exceptions of Germany and some adjacent states - LEI was 
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something mysterious: its nature and purpose were still obscured by some 
theoretical and practical legal uncertainties and confusions.  
Only at the end of the ‘80s the Commission has regulated such policy by 
adopting the European Directive 87/344  (“LEI Directive”) 4 that provides 
for a definition and clarifies that the insurer undertakes, against the payment 
of a premium, to bear the costs of legal proceedings, to provide other 
services directly linked to insurance cover (in particular with a view to 
secure compensation for the loss, damage or injury suffered by the insured 
person by settlement out of court or through civil or criminal proceedings) 
and to defend or represent the insured person in civil, criminal, 
administrative or other proceedings or in respect of any claim made against 
him (point 2). 
It aims primarily to neutralize any potential conflict of interest between 
insured and insurer: any conflict of interest arising, in particular, from the 
fact that the insurance company is covering another person or is covering a 
person in respect of both legal expenses and any other class of insurance 
should be precluded or resolved.  In this perspective, the specific conflicts 
between the LEI insurer and the insured persons on the issue of merit should 
be settled efficiently: thus, LEI Directive requires the Member States to 
adopt all appropriate measures to ensure that, in the event of a difference of 
opinion between a legal expenses insurer and his insured, a decision can be 
taken on the attitude to be adopted in order to settle the dispute (without 
prejudice to any right of appeal to a judicial body which might be provided 
for by national law, an arbitration or other procedure offering comparable 
garantees of objectivity is provided for whereby) (Article 6).  
At this regard, I underline that the Code of Practice of the International 
Association of LEI insurers (“RIAD”) - adopted in 1993 - also states that the 
legal expenses insurer shall carry out its activity for the benefit of the 
policyholder and shall assume the defence of the rights and legitimate 
interest of the latter, as though it were a matter concerning its own interests. 
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In 2005 the European Parliament had proposed to include legal expenses as 
part of the Fifth Motor Insurance Directive5, but the Commission’s 
consultation indicated that in the majority of the Member States voluntary 
legal expenses insurance is provided by specialized insurers or insurance 
companies and England, Germany, Belgium and Sweden held that a 
relatively large proportion of their population have access to such insurance. 
Thus, the latest Motor Insurance Directive has done little either to alter the 
nature of the LEI market, nor has it provided any impetus for growth. 
 
2. Before The Event Legal Expenses Insurance (“BTE”)  
 
Before the Event (“BTE”) insurance, also known as “BTE insurance”, is an 
insurance policy which can be taken out by those wishing to protect 
themselves against the potential litigation costs, which could be incurred 
following a future event. These costs often include solicitors’ fees, 
barristers, expert witnesses, court fees and any legal costs awarded to the 
other side. BTE insurance is generally paid on an annual basis to an 
insurance company and it is often sold as part of a household or car 
insurance packageand sometimes offered as a benefit to members of a trade 
union or association (V Prais 1995). 
The role and relevance of BTE insurance varies among European countries. 
The penetration rate of general household BTE insurance in Germany is 
some 50 %, by contrast, in England and Wales the demand for this type of 
insurance policy seems to be virtually absent. In other markets there is a 
trend towards multiple markets for BTE in which both middle-class 
households and SMEs display an increasing demand for BTE products (A 
Heyes, N Rickman and D Tzavarab 2004). 
A research by the UK Ministry of Justice in October 2007 found that despite 
59% of the population having legal expenses insurance, less than one in four 
consumers had ever heard of BTE or ATE legal expenses insurance and 
consequently the holders of certain policies (e.g., household insurance) may 
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not even be aware that their insurance also covers certain legal expenses. 
The research estimated that 28 millions of adults have BTE insurance, 
mostly as an add-on to another insurance policy. The research also shows 
that LEI is sold in a variety of ways (stand-alone, add-on) and through 
multiple channels and that the cover provided by add-on LEI is fragmented 
and sometimes duplicated 6. 
I agree with the idea that whether and how the BTE market in Europe will 
develop depends on domestic institutional factors, such as the extent of tax-
funded legal aid and the intensity of regulation of legal services. 
Accordingly, an author notes that “(…) one would expect a BTE market not 
to flourish in a country with comprehensive state-funded legal aid. And 
indeed, England and Wales spend a lot of taxpayers’ money on legal aid, 
while German consumers spend less on taxation for legal aid but all the 
more on private BTE LEI” (Van Boom 2009 at 5).  
One of the institutional settings that seem to be relevant in explaining 
differences in development of BTE markets pertains to the rules on cost 
shifting in civil procedure: it is more likely to thrive under cost regimes that 
generate a certain level of predictability so that the German costs rules (the 
loser pays according to fixed scales) are more beneficial to BTE insurers 
looking for predictability than the current English cost shifting rules.  
More important, BTE insurers have every incentive to fix and control 
lawyers’ remuneration and possibly even to employ in-house lawyers in 
order to accurately calculate (and cut) premiums. Again , the institutional 
environment in which BTE providers operate influences the interaction 
between insurers and independent providers of services on the market for 
legal services to a large extent. BTE insurers have an obvious interest in 
keeping the cost of litigation low: this may not be easily achieved in markets 
in which lawyers have a statutory monopoly on giving legal advice, as is the 
case in Germany, while, in countries where there is no such monopoly they 
have every opportunity to develop their own in-house legal expertise by 
vertically integrating lawyers into their business. By doing so, they can 
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achieve economies of scale and curtail agency problems inherent with 
outsourced legal services and, at the same time, they can contribute to 
improve the access to justice (M Kilian 2003).  
 
 
 
3. After The Event Legal Expenses Insurance (“ATE”) 
 
After the Event insurance, also known as “ATE insurance”,  can be taken 
out after an event, such as an accident which has caused an injury, to insure 
the policyholder for disbursements, as well as any costs should they lose 
their case.  
Such policy is thus entered into by the claimant (or his lawyer operating 
under some form of “conditional fee agreement”, in short: “CFA”) after the 
dispute has already arisen (G Wignall and S Green 2008). 
Two distinct versions of ATE insurance are currently available in Europe: 
ATE third party funding and ‘English ATE’ as an add-on insurance with 
CFA  (W H Van Boom 2009, at 9-10). 
First, ATE third party funding entails the following: i) the ATE provider 
will typically offer to finance all costs involved in a money claim, against a 
‘premium’ which is due only in case of success, ii) the provider diligently 
investigates the creditworthiness of the defendant and the viability of the 
claim (with the help of legal opinion of the lawyer who analyzes the case), 
iii) if the claim is found valid, ATE will provide the upfront funding 
required, the success premium is both contingent on the disputed amount 
and staged . 
The benefits of this type of ATE to impecunious and/or risk averse 
(commercial) claimants are self-evident, and in those jurisdictions that 
restrain lawyers admitted to the bar from charging their clients on any other 
basis than a (fixed) hourly fee the ATE insurance has the potential of 
becoming a competitive product. It seems likely, moreover, that restrained 
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lawyers would be tempted to associate themselves somehow with ATE 
providers: in the near future legal systems will be faced with the question 
whether lawyers would be allowed to accept commission for clients they 
refer to the provider (N Rickman & A Gray 1995). 
Second, the ‘English ATE insurance’ is different from the ATE funding 
before mentioned given that the specific conditions of English costs rules 
allow for a specific CFA plus ATE insurance agreement. In particular, for 
certain types of claims solicitors are permitted to offer their services under a 
CFA that denotes a combination of no-cure-no-pay and a success fee, a 
mark-up success fee, either in the form of a flat fee or an upscale fee 
expressed as percentage of basic hourly fee, but not contingent on the 
amount of the sum successfully recovered (R CA White & R Atkinson 
2000).   
Under the CFA, if the claimant is defeated in court his solicitor will not 
claim any remuneration. There is, however, still the issue of the prevailing 
defendant’s costs. English costs rules allow the claimant to take out ATE 
insurance covering these costs: if the claimant wins the case, he is allowed 
to shift the costs of both his lawyer’s fee and the ATE insurance premium 
onto the defendant. The defendant does not experience any specific financial 
consequences if he prevails. If he loses, however, he is forced to reimburse 
the claimant for the ATE insurance premium.  
Thus, the loosing opponent has to pay for the risk aversion of the winning 
party (G Wignall and S Green 2008).  
The Court of Appeal ruling in Rogers v Merth’lr Tydfi v. Be has brought 
some  certainty over some aspects of recovering ATE premiums from losing 
defendants 7.  The court ruled that the proportionality of the premium should 
relate to the costs risk, rather than the damages and also approved the 
pnnciple of premiums that are staged, meaning they go up at certain points 
of a case as it becomes more risky 8.  
 
3. Collective redress in the European Union  
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The market for LEI changes rapidly in accordance with the developments of 
the European litigation landscape. In particular, European companies and 
their insurers are beginning to see collective claims on the legal horizon and 
becoming concerned about the solutions they can take to limit the corporare 
liability risks arising from collective litigation (S Issacharoff and G Miller 
2008).  
And actually a Report by Lloyd’s and Rand Europe indicates three fast 
moving trends in litigation which are becoming influential on both sides of 
the Atlantic: third party litigation funding, forum shopping and class actions 
9
. With reference to the latter, the Report notes that the US has seen a 
substantial growth rate in class actions, although this rate now seems to be 
slowing, after the Class Action Fairness Act has entered into force 10.  It also 
underlines that some US class action firms are establishing a presence in 
England and a relevant part of the litigators believe that class actions will 
take root in the country within three years.   
At this stage, the picture is not clear, but developments are emerging in the 
civil procedure rules of some Member States and in European Law.  
The experiments about collective litigation in the Member States may be 
grouped into three main categories: (a) group actions, where individual 
actions are grouped into one procedure (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden), (b) 
representative actions, where one individual or an organization represents a 
group of individuals (Italy, Spain and France and (c) test cases, where a case 
brought by one or more persons leads to a judgment that forms the basis for 
other cases brought by persons with the same interest against the same 
defendant (England and Wales, Austria, Germany)  (D Hensler, C Hodges 
and M Tulibacka 2009, Hodges 2008, R Mulheron, 2004).   
In 2005 the Commission has issued the Green Paper “Damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules”, stating the necessity to introduce one or 
more mechanisms allowing the aggregation of the individual claims of 
victims of antitrust infringements: consumers, especially those who have 
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suffered a relatively low-value damage, are often deterred from bringing an 
individual action for damages due to the costs, the delays, the uncertainties 
and the burdens involved 11.  Thus, the Commission suggests a combination 
of two complementary mechanisms of collective redress to address 
effectively those issues in the field of Competition Law 12.  
A further step has been the adoption in 2008 of the White Paper suggesting 
some specific policy choices and measures that would help give all victims 
of infringements of EC Competition Law access to effective redress 
mechanisms so that they can be fully compensated for the harm they 
suffered 13.     
Few months later, the Directorate General on Consumer Affairs has adopted 
the Green Paper ‘On Consumer Collective Redress’ (“Green Paper”)14.   
Before the adoption of the Green Paper, a study by external contractors has 
provided the Commission with more information on the key problems faced 
by European consumers in obtaining redress for mass claims and has 
analyzed the consequences of such problems for consumers, competitors 
and the relevant market 15.  
In the light of the above, in the Green Paper on Consumer Collective 
Redress the Commission has reached the conclusion that:  
“the vast majority of the existing collective redress mechanisms tend to 
have some elements that work, and some that do not. Almost all existing 
collective redress mechanisms have some added value compared to 
individual judicial redress and alternative dispute resolution schemes. But 
their efficiency and effectiveness could be improved. The mechanisms 
have been applied in relatively few cases” (at point 12).  
In consideration of the confusing diversity of national approaches towards 
collective redress, many of which are relatively recent, the Commission 
faced considerable difficulty in identifying any given approach as a 
preferred solution (C Poncibò 2009).  
The Green Paper effectively side-steps this selection issue, by setting out a 
number of alternative options, without making a decision. In an important 
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change from many previous discussions on this issue, the options set out 
include not just judicial, court-based private litigation, but also encompass 
the involvement of public authorities in delivering redress and 
compensation, as well as the encouragement of voluntary and self-
regulatory mechanisms (“ADR”).  
Leaving aside the possibility to avoid any European initiative, two main  
perspectives, that can also be combined, have emerged in such context.  
The first consists in improving the cooperation between the Member States 
and, particularly, in utilising the existing national collective redress 
procedures, while opening them up to consumers from other Member States. 
This approach provides for the implementation of a network of entities that 
have the power to bring a collective redress action in those Member States 
having such mechanisms, including public bodies and consumer 
organisations, coupled with launching information campaigns about pending 
collective redress actions and enabling people to join them (e.g. the 
Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation 16).  
The network would need to involve an equitable mechanism for bearing the 
costs of proceedings (and distribution of money) to national and foreign 
consumers entitled, given that national entities might be reluctant to pay for 
foreign claimants 17.  
The second and much discussed option would be to adopt a non-binding, or 
binding, EU measure to ensure that a collective judicial mechanism exists in 
all Member States.  
This idea leaves from the fact that existing European instruments have a 
limited application to mass claims: the Mediation Directive, that has to be 
implemented by 2011, can only help in cases where the parties are willing to 
mediate 18, while the Small Claims Regulation concerns cross-border 
disputes not exceeding  a certain amount (i.e. 2.000 Euro) and whether it 
applies to collective redress will depend on national procedural rules 19 .  
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The Follow-up of the result of the Consultation on the Green Paper 
showed that no single option is fully satisfactory that only a combination 
of several instruments would be the most appropriate way forward 20.   
 
 
 
 
4. The position of the legal protection insurers  
 
According to the comments of the International Association of LEI insurers 
(“RIAD”), the Commission’s approach is too confined and it does not 
determine its general policy objectives correctly when it establishes that it 
wants to ensure access to effective means of redress for consumer mass 
claims across the European Union21. 
Legal protection insurers agree with the Commission that consumer 
confidence is important for the Internal Market and that confidence is 
created to a large extent by providing efficient means to pursue and defend 
legitimate interests and claims. But their association (“RIAD”) stresses that 
the Commission still does not succeed in convincing legal protection 
insurers that, above all, the lack of a legal framework for an EU-wide 
collective redress instrument actually distorts the Internal Market and that 
the absence of this particular instrument is responsible for the lack of 
consumer confidence. The problem is much broader and a more horizontal 
approach is necessary in order to embrace all possible implications, answers 
and remedies.  
Consequently, the general policy objective must rather be to facilitate easy, 
affordable and efficient access to law and justice across the EU in general 
without simply insinuating that access to mass claims is the only viable 
instrument and solution. In this context, LEI could be an important and 
affordable feature for consumers to enforce their rights efficiently.  
12 
 
More important, the legal protection insurers and their association have also 
stressed the importance of enhancing cooperation and compatibility between 
the different national systems and mechanisms before creating an additional 
European instrument which can hardly solve any of the existing consumer 
detriments.  
In such a perspective, they have rejected the idea of a EU-wide judicial 
collective redress mechanism of the consultation paper and have proposed to 
adopt a non-binding setting up of collective ADR schemes and judicial 
collective redress schemes) in combination with the adaptation of some 
other EU instruments would be likely to hold the best prospects.  
The approach of RIAD is in line with the proposal of the Green Paper on the 
review of the Brussels I Regulation to provide procedural means which 
facilitate the coordination of parallel proceedings before the courts of 
different Member States in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable 
judgments resulting from separate proceedings22.  
 
5. The litigation buyout insurance  
 
In the United States the “litigation buyout policy” (“LBP”) has been 
adopted, under certain circumstances,  to address the risks posed to 
corporate defendants by class actions and, more generally, mass tort 
litigation (T Baker and S J Griffith 2007). 
It is thus interesting to consider such policy that enalbes the insured to 
remove all, or part, of its risk in connection with an unresolved claim or 
claims or litigation by transferring future potential liabilities arising there 
from to the insurer.  
Such policy can either completely remove the contingent liability from the 
books of the insured or, at least, cap future financial risks associated with 
the litigation.  It can be structured to cover defence costs, settlements, 
judgments and defence costs or judgments only and it have been use in 
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cases involving  products liability, environmental and asbestos, intellectual 
property and tax.  
Unlike traditional insurance products, such policy covers events that  have 
already occurred or are known to the insurer when the policy is purchased 
(however, the amount of the total exposure remains uncertain). 
LBP has evolved to provide an insured with a customised strategy to 
manage and resolve a wide array of negative events, such as securities 
litigation, intellectual property claims, product liability, breach of contract 
disputes, employment practices claims. LBP has proven to be an effective 
tool in facilitating transactions when the parties cannot agree on the 
exposure arising from the litigation or the risk allocation associated with the 
litigation. The case is analyzed by risk managers to determine the most 
likely worst-case scenario, then tack on about 20 % to represent a margin of 
error, and another 15 % or so for expenses and profit.  
Projecting the size of a lawsuit requires a painstaking analysis implying to 
consider the case-law on that topic and to examine how those suits turned 
out and how successful they have been in that jurisdiction with similar 
litigation in the past (T Baker and S J Griffith 2007). 
Going into details, such policy usually falls within two categories: loss 
portfolio transfers and appeal hedges. 
Loss portfolio transfers, also known as buyouts, involve the insurer stepping 
into the shoes of the insured and taking over a pending litigation and 
ensuing liability. In exchange for assuming the potential liability arising 
from a litigation, the insurer will charge a premium based upon its 
expectations as to the settlement value or the judicial damages, plus 
underwriting costs and defence expenses. The most used version of the 
buyout is the liability cap: the liability cap acts as a stop loss for pending 
litigation, where the insured remains liable for a specified amount of 
damages, while the insurer assumes liability for the next layer of exposure. 
This coverage may be illustrated by the following example:  a company is a 
defendant in a large product liability litigation. The company seeks to be 
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acquired by a buyer in an M&A transaction, which becomes stalled due to 
the ongoing litigation.  
An LBP policy would insure the company against liability arising out of the 
pending product liability litigation not covered by its primary insurance 
carrier and would enable it to proceed with its M&A opportunity 23.  
This scheme comes from the “Samsonite Case”. The company was 
struggling with some heavy baggage as it attempted to recapitalize a couple 
of years ago. The cause of the load: shareholder litigation, filed in the wake 
of the stock-price free fall from a failed attempt to sell the company. The 
suits hampered the Denver-based manufacturer’s recapitalization efforts--
and threatened consequences even more dire. The company managed to 
remove its litigation burden, but not in any of the usual ways. By 
transferring the risk to an insurance company, Samsonite eased the worries 
of the investors it was courting. In addition to removing an impediment to 
consummating a transaction, several other benefits may accrue to an insured 
that purchases LBP coverage: i) it enables an insured to quantify the future 
value of liabilities resulting from third-party claims in order to manage them 
more effectively and, under certain circumstances, ii) it permits a public 
disclosure of an insurance solution for an ongoing litigation exposure, 
thereby sending a positive signal to the market and iii)  it also consents to 
the insured to focus its management time on running the business, rather 
than handling a time-consuming litigation. Moreover, appeal hedges serve 
as hedges against reversal on appeal of a favourable judgement, locking in 
the positive ruling’s benefits to the insured.  
In a buyout policy, the insurer will generally require complete control of the 
conduct of the litigation given that it assumes the entire risk and, generally, 
also covers all defense costs in connection therewith. In a cap or a hedge, 
where an insurer only assumes part of the risk or where the proceedings are 
already at an advanced stage, an insurer will want to maintain control over 
major strategic decisions, such as choice of counsel or right to settle. 
Although insureds usually cede those prerogatives only reluctantly, they 
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usually benefit from an insurer’s expertise in claims management and 
litigation. The control over litigation may therefore create problems when a 
claim is made against an insured, the insured and the insurer may disagree 
about the best way to resolve the claim. For instance, a settlement 
opportunity presents itself and the insurer wants to settle the claim but the 
insured does not. Or, there may be a judgment against the insured, which the 
insurer is willing to accept as final resolution of the claim, but the insured is 
not and instead wants to appeal the matter further. Perhaps the insured 
believes their business will ultimately be exonerated of any wrongdoing and 
would rather litigate to reach that point. Or, the insured doesn’t want to 
settle because they believe there is further room to negotiate for a more 
favorable resolution.   
Most  LBP policies contain a “hammer clause” which allows the insurer to 
resolve these differences of opinion. The clause is usually found in the 
section of the policy that discusses settlement and whether the insurer has 
the right to settle or must obtain the insured’s consent before doing so.  
The majority of hammer clauses allow the insurer to cap or limit their 
ultimate exposure in a particular claim.  For example, some policies say that 
if the insured does not agree to settle a claim the insurer wants to settle, the 
insurer’s exposure is capped at the amount they would pay to resolve the 
claim, plus a percentage of the future costs incurred in resolving the claim 
(including defense and indemnity). Disclosure of the existence of coverage 
is also a delicate issue. The amount of coverage under this kind of policy is 
based on the potential liability arising from the lawsuit and maximum 
coverage is typically tied to damages sought in the lawsuit. As a rule of 
thumb, higher premiums will be charged by the insurance company for 
assuming increased exposure. Insurers usually impose confidentiality 
restrictions under the assumption that the outcome of the litigation may be 
adversely impacted if a court or claimant comes to know that a ‘deep 
pocket’ insurer agreed to assume the liability. From an insured’s 
perspective, however, the ability to disclose such coverage may be a priority 
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- a press release announcing that a major contingent liability has been 
removed from a company’s balance sheet sends a very positive message to 
the market   (T Baker and S J Griffith 2007).  
 
6. Legal insurance in the light of the Eschig case 
 
The “free choice of the lawyer” by the insured person or company is, 
granted by the Article 4 (1) of the LEI Directive, providing that:  
“Any contract of legal expenses insurance shall expressly recognize that: 
(a) where recourse is had to a lawyer or other person appropriately 
qualified according to national law in order to defend, represent or serve 
the interests of the insured person in any inquiry or proceedings, that 
insured person shall be free to choose such lawyer or other person; 
(b) the insured person shall be free to choose a lawyer or, if he so prefers 
and to the extent that national law so permits, any other appropriately 
qualified person, to serve his interests whenever a conflict of interests 
arises”. 
The free choice of the lawyer is restricted in instances when legal 
representation by a lawyer before an official court is compulsory by law 
(attorney, barrister, solicitor or whatever the official title of this 
representative may be).   
Within the framework of the legal expences insurances and, particularly, the 
litigation buyout policies (as better illustrated in the previous paragraph), the 
insured person or company may have to give up some, if not all, control 
over the defence of the case in favor of the insurance company.  
It is not uncommon for a policy to stipulate: “We will choose an appointed 
representative to act for you. If you are not satisfied with the appointed 
representative we have chosen, you can choose another appointed 
representative” and “We may choose not to accept an appointed 
representative of your choice but this will only be in exceptional 
circumstances” (Van Boom 2009 at 7). Thus, by shaping the BTE LEI 
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contract, the insurer remains in control of the choice of lawyer and 
minimizes control of the insured over the policy. 
Evidently, the interests of the LEI insurer do not necessarily converge with 
the interests of the policyholder with regard to both merits and free choice 
of counsel. As article 4 does not specifically oblige insurers to actively 
disclose the right of free choice of counsel to the policyholder, these rights 
are more or less obscured in the small print (Van Boom 2009).  
Moreover, even if insurers were to actively disclose this right to the 
policyholder in the claims process, there would still be the matter of merit. 
The Directive does not restrain the insurer from assessing merit before 
allowing the policyholder to litigate. 
In the light of the above it is clear that the ideal of ‘free choice of lawyer’ 
does not fit easily within the business model of some LEI providers.  
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has recently ruled that the Austrian 
legal expenses insurers practice of selecting the lawyers to represent their 
clients in collective redress proceedings is an inadmissible limitation of the 
rights of the insured.  
The case (“Eschig”) concerns the so-called, “mass claims clause” used by 
Austrian legal protection insurers 24.   
In Austria, as in other European countries, legal protection insurers seek to 
combine the legal representation of their clients’ interests: the  “mass claims 
clause allows” insurers to select the legal team when several insured parties 
in similar situations wish to pursue claims against the same opposing party 
25
. In Eschig the referring court asked, in essence, whether the before quoted 
Article 4(1) (a) of the LEI Directive  is to be interpreted as entitling the legal 
expenses insurer to reserve the right, where a large number of insured 
persons suffer losses as a result of the same event, itself to select the legal 
representative of all the insured persons concerned.   
On the contrary, the insurance industry has stated that, by selecting 
specialised lawyers, it is possible to optimise the professional competence to 
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best defend the clients’ interest and has expressed concerns on the “strict” 
interpretation given by the ECJ of the LEI Directive.  
According to the Advocate-General Verica Trstenjak the position of Article 
4(1)(a) within the overall structure of LEI Directive and the aims of the 
directive indicate that the right to a legal representative of one’s choice in 
proceedings and inquiries is intended to be an independent right and that, in 
the light of the above, the article 4 (1) (a) also applies in mass tort cases 26. 
Following the reasoning of the Advocate-General, the ECJ has ruled that the 
Austrian legal expenses insurers practice of selecting the lawyers to 
represent their clients in mass tort cases is an inadmissible limitation of the 
rights of the insured under the LEI Directive.  
From a legal point of view the ruling is consistent with the LEI Directive, 
grounding on the principle that every citizen should be free to choose 
his/her legal counsel, and which makes no exemption from the free choice 
of lawyer in respect of collective actions. However, it is also true that the 
‘mass claims clause’ may also be in the interest of individuals, who all have 
a common cause of action and for who the use of a single legal team may 
have the effect of improving the management of their legal action.    
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